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HEFFERNAN v. CITY OF PATERSON: WATERING DOWN 
 THE FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION DOCTRINE 
 TO CREATE A PERCEPTION OF PROTECTION 
 FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
PETER J. ARTESE 
In Heffernan v. City of Paterson,1 the Supreme Court evaluated whether 
an employee’s First Amendment2 retaliation claim can survive if the em-
ployer believes that the employee engaged in protected First Amendment 
conduct, but the employee did not in fact do so.3  The Court analyzed a police 
department’s demotion of an officer based on its mistaken perception that he 
participated in protected political activity.4  Without reaching the merits of 
the case, the Court held that a decision motivated by a perceived exercise of 
First Amendment conduct might violate the Constitution.5  While the Court 
justly ruled in the plaintiff’s favor,6 the majority imprudently decided the case 
based on unreliable precedent, without fully explaining the impact of its hold-
ing.7  In the face of a circuit split surrounding the issue,8 the Court missed an 
opportunity to formally adopt a perceived affiliation approach by expanding 
on its firmly established political affiliation case law.9  As a result, the Court 
failed to establish a clear method for approaching future First Amendment 
public employment retaliation cases despite attractive and intuitive options.10  
Thus, while Heffernan undoubtedly represents a victory for public employ-
ees’ First Amendment rights, it may prove to be a hollow victory over time 
if future courts fail to build on Heffernan’s fragile foundations.11 
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 1.  136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 3.  See infra Part III.  
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part III. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Part II.C.  
 9.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 10.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 11.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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I.  THE CASE 
On April 13, 2006, a bedridden New Jersey mother made a simple re-
quest of her son: to replace a campaign sign for a mayoral candidate, Law-
rence Spagnola, that had recently been stolen from her lawn.12  The son, De-
tective Jeffrey Heffernan of the Paterson Police Department, obliged and 
contacted the Spagnola campaign to arrange to pick up the sign.13  While at 
the campaign headquarters, another police officer observed Heffernan’s brief 
encounter with Spagnola’s campaign manager.14  Word of Heffernan’s pres-
ence at the headquarters spread quickly.15  When his supervisor confronted 
him the following day, Detective Heffernan denied any political involve-
ment.16  Nevertheless, because of his perceived involvement in the Spagnola 
campaign, his supervisor demoted him.17 
Shortly after, Heffernan filed a Section 198318 action for unconstitu-
tional retaliation under the First Amendment in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against the City of Paterson, then-Mayor Jose Torres, 
Police Chief James Wittig, and Police Administrator Michael Walker.19  Spe-
cifically, Heffernan stated claims for a retaliatory demotion based on Heffer-
nan’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech and retaliatory demotion 
based on his exercise of the right to freedom of association.20  After a com-
plex procedural history, including a vacated trial verdict in favor of Heffer-
nan, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.21 
                                                          
 12.  Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 
136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016). 
 13.  Id. at 150.  At the time of the incident, Heffernan was a detective assigned to administrative 
detail in the office of the Chief of Police, James Wittig.  Id. at 149.  Spagnola, a former Paterson 
police chief and personal friend of Heffernan, was running against the incumbent mayor at the time, 
Jose Torres.  Id. at 149–50.  
 14.  Id. at 150. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  To no avail, Heffernan attempted to explain that he only acted to help his sick mother.  
Id.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .). 
 19.  Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563, 566–68 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 777 F.3d 
147 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016). 
 20.  Id. at 569. 
 21.  Heffernan, 777 F.3d at 150–51.  After resolving cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
case proceeded to trial on the free-association claim alone, resulting in a verdict of $105,000 in 
favor of Heffernan.  Id. at 150.  The presiding judge later discovered a personal conflict of interest, 
removed himself from the case and vacated the verdict.  Id.  Upon reassignment, the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the free-expression claim, but failed to rule on the 
free-association claim.  Id.  The Third Circuit concluded that the district court erred in granting 
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The district court found that Heffernan failed to produce evidence that 
he actually exercised his First Amendment rights.22  Heffernan admitted, in 
fact, that he did not engage in actual speech or expression and, as a result, the 
court rejected his free speech claim and granted the defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment.23  Similarly, because Heffernan expressly denied any po-
litical affiliation with the Spagnola campaign, the district court rejected his 
free association claim.24  Further, the district court also barred Heffernan 
from advancing arguments based on perceived speech and affiliation.25  Hef-
fernan argued that a viable First Amendment claim existed based on his em-
ployer’s mistaken belief that he engaged in protected speech or affiliation, 
referred to as a “perceived affiliation” claim.26  The court rejected this claim 
as well.27 
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Heffernan 
argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on his 
free association and free speech claims.28  Echoing the lower court, the Third 
Circuit held that Heffernan’s lack of actual speech or association proved fatal 
to his claims.29  Although the court recognized that his actions could have 
had the effect of assisting the Spagnola campaign, by Heffernan’s own testi-
mony, this was not his intent.30  By admitting that his actions lacked a politi-
cal motivation, Heffernan failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, war-
ranting a grant of summary judgment against him on this theory.31 
The Third Circuit also addressed Heffernan’s theory of “perceived sup-
port.”32  Heffernan again argued that despite his lack of actual First Amend-
ment speech or conduct, his case should still go to trial because his superiors 
                                                          
summary judgment and remanded the case, with instructions to address the free-association claim 
and allow the parties to file briefs in opposition.  Id.  The parties again filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  Id.   
 22.  Heffernan, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 573–74. 
 23.  Id. at 576.  
 24.  Id. at 580.  The district court noted that Heffernan was not a resident of Paterson and could 
not vote in its elections.  Id. at 579.  Heffernan was a personal friend of Spagnola and had testified 
that “he had no political connection to Spagnola.”  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 575, 580.  
 26.  See id. at 575 (“Under the law of this Circuit, there can be no retaliation claim based on an 
employer’s mere perception that the plaintiff has engaged in protected speech or expression.”). 
 27.  Id. at 583. 
 28.  Heffernan, 777 F.3d at 151–52.  
 29.  See id. at 152–53 (affirming on the same grounds after noting that the district court “rec-
ognized” the problem with Heffernan’s theory).  
 30.  See id. (stating that “Heffernan repeatedly disavowed anything resembling” political 
speech and restated that he was only picking up a sign for his mother). 
 31.  Id. at 153 (“In other words, Heffernan asks us to eliminate a traditional element of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim—namely, the requirement that the plaintiff in fact exercised a First 
Amendment right.”). 
 32.  Id. at 153–54. 
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believed that he had engaged in political speech and acted on that mistaken 
belief.33  The Third Circuit, however, had previously rejected perceived con-
duct theories for First Amendment retaliation cases so, bound by precedent, 
it rejected this argument and affirmed the district court’s decision.34  The 
court emphatically held that “a free-speech retaliation claim is actionable un-
der [Section] 1983 only where the adverse action at issue was prompted by 
an employee’s actual, rather than perceived, exercise of constitutional 
rights.”35  Because Heffernan did not actually associate or, at minimum, take 
a stance of “calculated” political neutrality, the court explained the police 
department’s reaction to a mistaken belief could not amount to a constitu-
tional violation.36  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Heffernan’s ap-
peal to determine whether the Third Circuit erred in rejecting his “perceived 
support” theory.37 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 The government possesses more authority as an employer than as sov-
ereign.38  It is still capable, however, of infringing on its employees’ consti-
tutionally protected fundamental rights.  Part II.A of this Note explores early 
understandings of the government’s ability to condition the terms of public 
employment.  Part II.B then examines judicial developments throughout the 
mid-twentieth century, which expanded the rights of public employees with 
respect to both free speech and political association.  Part II.C subsequently 
addresses the different approaches federal courts have applied to First 
Amendment retaliation cases involving public employees. 
A.  Until the Mid-Twentieth Century, Government Employers 
Possessed Vast Authority to Condition Public Employment 
For most of the twentieth century, courts afforded the government wide 
latitude to condition public employment.39  Inspired by then-Massachusetts 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ “classic formulation” of the 
                                                          
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. (citing Ambrose v. Township of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2002); Fogarty 
v. Bowles, 121 F.3d 886, 619 (3d Cir. 1997)); see infra Part II.C.3.  
 35.  Heffernan, 777 F.3d at 153 (first citing Ambrose, 303 F.3d at 496; then citing Fogarty, 121 
F.3d at 619). 
 36.  Id. at 154.  The court did concede that Heffernan’s choice to remain politically neutral may 
have been protected, but that a politically apathetic posture was not.  Id.  
 37.  Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 29 (2015) (mem.). 
 38.  See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (“[T]he government as employer indeed 
has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”). 
 39.  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“For most of this century, the unchal-
lenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms 
of employment”). 
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notion that “[{a} policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, 
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman,”40 the pre-1967 Supreme 
Court consistently allowed governmental intrusions on public employees’ 
First Amendment rights.  For example, in 1951, the Court permitted munici-
palities to extract an oath from employees that they were not members of the 
Communist Party.41  Additionally, the Court upheld laws barring public 
school teachers from membership in organizations, such as the Communist 
Party, that were founded on subversive and illegal goals, regardless of the 
employees’ intentions to actually carry out those goals.42  More generally, the 
Court also upheld the Hatch Act,43 which forbade federal employees from 
taking active part in political management and campaigning.44  Underpinning 
these decisions was the idea that a citizen had no right to public employment, 
and therefore, could not protest the conditions of employment.45 
In 1967, however, the Court reversed track in the landmark decision 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.46  In Keyishian, the Court held that “[m]ere 
knowing membership” in the Communist Party could not furnish an adequate 
basis for a public employee’s dismissal.47  Just five years later, the Court held 
that a teacher could not be terminated for publicly criticizing the Board of 
Regents in charge of the school.48  The Court explained its departure from 
the previously near absolute protection of government employers, proclaim-
ing that “even though a person has no ‘right’ to [public employment] and 
even though the government may deny [it] for any number of reasons,”49 the 
government may not deny employment on a basis that infringes on a person’s 
                                                          
 40.  Id. at 143–44 (alteration in original) (quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 
N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)). 
 41.  See Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720–21 (1951) (permitting 
the government to require oaths and affidavits disclaiming membership in the Communist Party for 
employment). 
 42.  See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding a ban on communists as 
government employees). 
 43.  See An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 
(1939) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2012)) (officially titled the Hatch Act).  
 44.  See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 (1973) 
(upholding the Hatch Act); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93 (1947) (same); see 
also Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 375 (1882) (upholding the prohibition forbidding federal em-
ployees from giving or taking money for political purposes to other government employees).  
 45.  See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (“The pe-
titioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”). 
 46.  385 U.S. 589 (1967).  
 47.  Id. at 606.  
 48.  Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). 
 49.  Id. at 597.  
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First Amendment rights.50  Through these decisions, the Court planted seeds 
for First Amendment public employment protections to blossom in years to 
come. 
B.  The Court Has Extended Protection to a Public Employee’s Free 
Association and Free Speech Rights 
1.  Government May Not Make Adverse Employment Decisions 
Solely Based on Political Affiliation Under the First Amendment 
As First Amendment jurisprudence progressed, the Court addressed 
specific government practices, such as political patronage,51 and strengthened 
rights for public employees.  Resting on Keyishian and Perry, a plurality of 
the Court in Elrod v. Burns52 held that public employees could not be dis-
charged solely on the basis of political affiliation.53  While the Court recog-
nized the historical role of patronage practices,54 the plurality held that “to 
survive constitutional challenge, it must further some vital government end 
by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in 
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of consti-
tutionally protected rights.”55  Evaluating the proffered governmental inter-
ests in retaining patronage dismissals,56 the plurality held that patronage dis-
missals are valid only if limited to policymaking employees.57 
                                                          
 50.  Id.; see also id. (“For if the government could deny [public employment] to a person be-
cause of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would 
in effect be penalized and inhibited.”). 
 51.  See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1976) (detailing the history of political patron-
age).  Political patronage was the tradition of placing loyal party supporters in government jobs 
made available by firing members of the opposing party when the new party took office.  Id. at 353.  
Patronage had existed at the federal level since Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, and became popu-
larized and legitimized by the Andrew Jackson administration.  Id.  While political patronage took 
many forms, the Elrod Court only addressed dismissal of government employees for purely partisan 
reasons.  Id. 
 52.  427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
 53.  Id. at 373. 
 54.  See id. at 353–55 (discussing the history of patronage practices throughout American his-
tory). 
 55.  Id. at 363. 
 56.  The government offered three interests to justify the use of patronage dismissals: govern-
ment effectiveness and efficiency; political loyalty of employees so as to avoid the obstruction of 
implementing certain policy choices of the controlling party; and the preservation of the democratic 
process.  Id. at 364–73.  
 57.  Id. at 372.  The plurality held that patronage dismissals were not the least restrictive means 
for furthering government efficiency or preserving the democratic process.  Id.  Insuring party loy-
alty, so as to effectively implement the wishes of the electorate, was the only interest in which 
patronage dismissals could be justified, if limited to only policymaking employees.  Id.; see also id. 
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Four years later, the Court reaffirmed Elrod’s holding and provided clar-
ity to the doctrine.  In Branti v. Finkel,58 the Court held that assistant public 
defenders could not be dismissed solely based on their party affiliation.59  The 
Court eliminated the policymaker distinction and reconstructed the inquiry to 
focus on “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation 
is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public of-
fice involved.”60  The new standard would allow government employers to 
terminate an employee only where an employee’s private political beliefs 
would interfere with the discharge of the employee’s duties and disrupt the 
government’s compelling interest in efficiency.61  Furthermore, in Rutan v. 
Republican Party,62 the Court extended these standards to other employment 
decisions, including the “promotion, transfer, recall or hiring decisions in-
volving public employment positions for which party affiliation is not an ap-
propriate requirement.”63  Thus, unless the government can show that party 
affiliation is “an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the 
public office involved,”64 adverse employment actions based solely on party 
affiliation violate the First Amendment’s right to free association. 
2.  Government May Not Make Adverse Employment Decisions 
Based on an Employee’s Speech on a Matter of Public Concern 
In addition to associational rights, the Supreme Court has also extended 
First Amendment free speech protections to public employees where the em-
ployee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern.65  In Pickering v. 
Board of Education,66 the Court held that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to 
                                                          
at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality that “a nonpolicymaking, nonconfiden-
tial government employee can[not] be discharged . . . from a job that he is satisfactorily performing 
upon the sole ground of his political beliefs”).  
 58.  445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 59.  Id. at 518–19.  
 60.  Id. at 518.  The Court also held that “there is no requirement that dismissed employees 
prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing . . . their political allegiance.”  
Id. at 517. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
 63.  Id. at 68, 76; see also O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714–15 
(1996) (extending First Amendment protections enjoyed by public employees to independent con-
tractors contracting with the State). 
 64.  Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.  Courts evaluate this party affiliation requirement under a reason-
ableness standard.  O’Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 719. 
 65.  See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (declaring that statements made pursu-
ant to official job duties are not matters of public concern); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 
(requiring speech to touch on matters of public concern before obtaining First Amendment protec-
tion); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (establishing a balancing test to evaluate the 
weight of government interests against public employees’ First Amendment rights). 
 66.  391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
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speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dis-
missal from public employment.”67  The Court applied a balancing test, 
which weighed the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees.”68  Ruling for the teacher, the Court expressed concern over the po-
tential dangers posed to free speech if dismissals from public employment 
based on speech went unchallenged.69  Thus, the Pickering Court established 
that when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, 
the government employer may not discipline the employee unless the gov-
ernment’s interest in promoting efficient public service outweighs the First 
Amendment content at stake.70 
Later, in Connick v. Myers,71 the Court elaborated on how to apply the 
Pickering test.  In Connick, the Court held that the termination of an assistant 
district attorney due to her distribution of inflammatory questionnaires to her 
co-workers, which asked their opinion on the operation of the office, did not 
warrant First Amendment protection.72  Seizing this opportunity to clarify 
Pickering’s rule, the Court attempted to define when speech touched on “mat-
ter[s] of public concern.”73  The Court held that “[w]hen employee expression 
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community,”74 the speech does not address a public con-
cern.75  Moreover, the Court cautioned that if employee speech does not touch 
                                                          
 67.  Id. at 574.  
 68.  Id. at 568; see also id. at 573 (“[W]e conclude that the interest of the school administration 
in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its 
interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”). 
 69.  See id. at 574. 
 70.  Id. at 568.  This test resembles, albeit without any balancing features, the affiliation dis-
missal test as described by the Court in Branti v. Finkel.  See 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (holding 
that government employers may not terminate employees for partisan purposes unless party mem-
bership was necessary to effectively perform the job at issue).  
 71.  461 U.S. 138 (1983).  
 72.  Id. at 147–48.  The Court did note that Myers’s speech may have touched public concerns 
in an extremely narrow way, but could be best characterized as an employee grievance, rendering 
judicial intervention inappropriate.  Id. at 154.  
 73.  Id. at 146–54. 
 74.  Id. at 146. 
 75.  Id.; see also id. at 147.  The Court reasoned:  
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom 
of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s 
behavior. 
Id.  
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on a “matter of public concern, it is unnecessary [for the judiciary] . . . to 
scrutinize the reasons for [the employee’s] discharge.”76 
Later, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,77 the Court rejected an assistant district 
attorney’s First Amendment claim where, after writing a critical memoran-
dum questioning the validity of an affidavit of probable cause, his supervisor 
terminated him.78  The Court reasoned that public employees do not speak as 
private citizens in communications made in the course of their official du-
ties.79  Reaffirming the principles of Connick, the Court held that an employee 
speaking pursuant to his or her official job duties does not receive protection 
from the First Amendment80; rather, employers retain the right to review an 
employee’s official communications and “take proper corrective action” 
when necessary.81 
In sum, when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, and not pursuant to his or her official governmental duties, the gov-
ernment-employer cannot discipline the employee for exercising his or her 
First Amendment rights. 
C.  Different Approaches Exist When Evaluating First Amendment 
Retaliation Cases 
To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 
“prove that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, and that it was 
a substantial or motivating factor in the termination.”82  Once the employee 
meets this burden, the government still may avoid liability if it can show the 
termination still would have occurred without the protected conduct or some 
legitimate government interest outweighed the First Amendment considera-
tions.83  Due to uncertainty in doctrinal principles, courts have struggled with 
the how to define the parameters of which actions or inactions merit protec-
tion.84  Moreover, a lack of uniformity regarding where to place analytical 
emphasis has led to inconsistent results across jurisdictions.85 
                                                          
 76.  Id. at 146. 
 77.  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 78.  Id. at 414–17. 
 79.  Id. at 421.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. at 422–23.  
 82.  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996). 
 83.  Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). 
 84.  See infra Parts II.C.2–3. 
 85.  See infra Parts II.C.2–3.   
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1.  The Supreme Court Has Opened the Possibility of Focusing Solely 
on Employer Intent 
In Waters v. Churchill,86 a plurality of the Supreme Court recognized 
that “[g]overnment action based on protected speech may . . . violate the First 
Amendment even if the government actor honestly believes the speech is un-
protected.”87  The plurality called for public employers to conduct a reason-
able inquiry into the speech at issue and determine whether the First Amend-
ment protects the statements or conduct.88  If after conducting the inquiry, the 
public employer reasonably believes that the speech was not protected by the 
First Amendment, they may escape liability.89  However, the same employers 
may be liable if they find the employee’s speech or conduct to be protected 
and retaliated all the same.90  By formulating the inquiry in this way, the plu-
rality suggested that the government’s motives for pursuing a given employ-
ment action should be the focus of a reviewing court.91  Thus, the plurality 
chose to focus on the employer’s subjective knowledge of an employee’s ac-
tions rather than the content of the actual employee conduct at issue.92  In the 
years following Waters, circuit courts have applied this logic in two contra-
dictory ways, with particular emphasis on political affiliation. 
2.  Some Circuits Have Opened the Door for Perceived Affiliation 
Claims While Others Interpret Waters to Prevent These Claims 
In 2008, the Tenth Circuit held that a public employee does not have to 
show active support for a particular candidate in an election to state a claim 
for retaliation based on affiliation, in Gann v. Cline.93  The plaintiff in Gann 
alleged that her political neutrality resulted in her termination because her 
boss perceived this neutrality as political opposition.94  Instead of requiring 
the plaintiff to show active political conduct, the court believed that the “only 
relevant consideration is the impetus for the [employer’s] decision.”95  Thus, 
                                                          
 86.  511 U.S. 661 (1994).  
 87.  Id. at 669.  
 88.  Id. at 677–79. 
 89.  Id.; see also id. at 682 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[A] public employer who reasonably be-
lieves . . . that an employee engaged in constitutionally unprotected speech may punish the em-
ployee . . . even if it turns out that the employee’s actual remarks were constitutionally protected.”). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 677–78 (plurality opinion).  
 92.  Id.  Because the issue of a factual mistake presented a novel question to the Waters Court, 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, stated that, for the time being, a “case-by-case” approach 
should be adopted “until some workable general rule emerges.”  Id. at 671.  This Note contends that 
Heffernan presented the opportunity for said general rule to emerge.  See infra Part IV.  
 93.  See 519 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing whether the plaintiff actively en-
gaged in protected behavior as “irrelevant”).  
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. 
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similar to Waters and consistent with the Elrod line of cases, the Tenth Cir-
cuit focused squarely on employer motive in an affiliation context.96 
Later that year, the First Circuit followed suit.97  In Welch v. Ciampa,98 
a police chief demoted a detective for not supporting his campaign to win a 
recall election.99  Although the plaintiff could not show he engaged in any 
conduct apart from political neutrality, the court held that “[w]hether [the 
detective] actually affiliated himself . . . is not dispositive since the [police 
chief] attributed to him that affiliation.”100  Once more a court found that First 
Amendment activity may help a plaintiff’s case, but it is not required to state 
a claim.101 
With perhaps the strongest endorsement of this approach, in Dye v. Of-
fice of the Racing Commission,102 the Sixth Circuit recognized perceived af-
filiation, relying on Waters, Gann, and Welch.103  After evaluating the differ-
ent approaches to perceived affiliation claims, the court adopted the rationale 
of the First and Tenth Circuits, holding that “retaliation based on perceived 
political affiliation is actionable under the political-affiliation retaliation doc-
trine.”104  The court also relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Waters to 
conclude that the focus of judicial inquiry should the government employer’s 
subjective belief.105  The court declared that employers should remain liable 
for factual mistakes that form the basis for their actions.106 
                                                          
 96.  See id. at 1093–94 (discussing the Supreme Court’s political patronage jurisprudence).  In-
terestingly, the court in Gann used a test that almost identically resembled the test for a free-speech 
claim.  See id. at 1093 (“Once a plaintiff proves political patronage was a substantial or motivating 
factor behind his dismissal, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove, as an affirm-
ative defense, that the discharge would have occurred regardless of any discriminatory political 
motivation.” (citing Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1452 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
 97.  See Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 938–39 (1st Cir. 2008) (recognizing claims based on 
perceived political affiliation).  
 98.  542 F.3d 927 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 99.  Id. at 933–34.  
 100.  Id. at 939.  
 101.  See id.  The Court explained:  
We recognize that a plaintiff’s active support of a candidate or cause may help the plain-
tiff meet her evidentiary burden of showing that the adverse employment decision was 
substantially motivated by her political affiliation.  But neither active campaigning for a 
competing party nor vocal opposition to the defendant’s political persuasion are required. 
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Acevedo–Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 1993)).  
 102.  702 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 103.  Id. at 299–300. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.  
 106.  See id. at 302 (“An employer that acts upon such assumptions regarding the affiliation of 
her employees should not escape liability because her assumptions happened to be faulty.”).  
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However, as a matter of law, other jurisdictions still require a showing 
of actual First Amendment conduct.107  In Jones v. Collins,108 the Fifth Circuit 
denied a perceived conduct claim because the plaintiff denied exercising First 
Amendment rights.109  The court there, after citing Waters, stated that First 
Amendment suits must be based on actual conduct.110  Additionally, the 
Ninth Circuit, in Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior College,111 rejected an 
employee’s claim that her termination violated the First Amendment where 
she admitted an absence of speech.112  Finding Waters only applied to con-
tent-based mistakes, the court rejected her claim based on perceived con-
duct.113  Thus, while Waters may have influenced some courts, other re-
mained hesitant to adopt a perceived conduct approach. 
3.  The Third Circuit Has Consistently Rejected Claims Based on 
Perceived First Amendment Conduct 
In Ambrose v. Township of Robinson,114 the Third Circuit soundly re-
jected a claim based on perceived affiliation.115  Employing the traditional 
three step test for protected speech,116 the court remarked that “[p]laintiffs in 
First Amendment retaliation cases can sustain their burden of proof only if 
their conduct was constitutionally protected, and, therefore, only if there ac-
tually was conduct.”117  The court also seized upon a small point made in 
passing in Waters in a markedly different way than the Sixth Circuit in 
Dye.118  It honed in on a single sentence of Waters, which stated that it is not 
                                                          
 107.  See, e.g., Wasson v. Sonoma Cty. Junior Coll., 203 F.3d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
a perceived speech claim); Jones v. Collins, 132 F.3d 1048, 1053 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Fogarty 
v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (same).  
 108.  132 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 109.  Id. at 1055. 
 110.  See id. at 1053 (citing Waters and subsequently requiring the plaintiff to show actual First 
Amendment expression).  
 111.  203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 112.  Id. at 663.  The plaintiff’s employer mistakenly believed she had written defamatory letters 
about her boss.  Id. at 661–62.  
 113.  See id. at 663 (distinguishing Waters on the grounds that the mistake in Waters dealt with 
whether speech was protected, whereas the mistake in Wasson was the employer’s mistake regard-
ing the individual who spoke).   
 114.  303 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 115.  Id. at 495–96.  
 116.  See id. at 493 (“First a plaintiff must show that his conduct was constitutionally protected.  
Second, he must show that his protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged 
retaliatory action.  Finally, the defendant may defeat the plaintiff’s case ‘by showing that it would 
have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct.’” (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996)). 
 117.  Id. at 495 (citing Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 890).  
 118.  Compare id. (reading Waters as foreclosing on the possibility of perceived support retali-
ation claims), with Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 300 (6th Cir. 2012) (reject-
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necessarily “a violation of the Constitution for a government employer to 
discharge an employee based on substantively incorrect information,” the 
Third Circuit rejected the perceived affiliation approach.119  Years later, the 
Third Circuit doubled-down on this position in Heffernan v. City of Pater-
son120 barring another claim based on perceived affiliation and conduct.121  
Without active support or, at a minimum, explicit neutrality, an affiliation 
retaliation claim in the Third Circuit could not survive.122 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee is entitled to seek redress for a retaliatory demotion under the First 
Amendment where the employee did not engage in protected conduct, but the 
employer had mistakenly believed the opposite.123  The Court determined that 
in the absence of protected First Amendment conduct, the employer’s motive 
for retaliation against an employee should serve as the inquiry for a free 
speech or political affiliation retaliation claim.124 
The Court framed the legal issue as whether the police department’s 
factual mistake as to Heffernan’s exercise of protected conduct made a “crit-
ical legal difference.”125  Initially, the Court repeated the long-recognized 
standard that the First Amendment generally prohibits government officials 
from dismissing or demoting employees in response to their exercise of pro-
tected First Amendment conduct.126  Because Heffernan repeatedly denied 
any formal political affiliation with the Spagnola campaign, however, this 
situation presented a more complex legal issue than previous cases.127  If Hef-
fernan’s supervisors were correct in their assessment of his conduct, the 
Court noted that a clear constitutional violation would have existed.128  Due 
                                                          
ing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Waters and calling its reliance on Waters’ dicta “disingen-
uous”).  The Sixth Circuit contended that this quote from Waters was meant only to apply to the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of whether the employer had a reasonable belief that speech was or was 
not protected.  Dye, 702 F.3d at 300 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679 (1994)). 
 119.  Id. (quoting Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 890 (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 679)). 
 120.  777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015) rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016). 
 121.  See id. at 153 (refusing “to eliminate a traditional element of a First Amendment retaliation 
claim—namely, the requirement that the plaintiff in fact exercised a First Amendment right”).  The 
court also foreclosed on a perceived speech standard.  Id.  
 122.  Id. at 154. 
 123.  136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016).  
 124.  See id. at 1418 (“[T]he government’s reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here.”). 
 125.  Id. at 1416.  
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id. at 1416–18.  
 128.  Id. at 1417.  The Court also assumed none of the exceptions which allow government em-
ployees to condition employment on the basis of certain First Amendment actions were present in 
this case.  Id.   
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to this factual mistake by the police department, the vast body of case law 
concerning free-speech retaliation provided little guidance.129 
Relying on Waters v. Churchill, the Court held that an employer’s mo-
tive for the adverse action should be the focal point of judicial inquiry in 
cases where a factual mistake exists as to whether the employee exercised 
First Amendment rights.130  Although Waters involved an employer who al-
leged she reasonably, but mistakenly, believed the employee’s speech was 
unprotected, the Court found the emphasis on employer motive persuasive.131  
Applying this logic, the Court expanded the applicability of Waters: 
When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent 
the employee from engaging in political activity that the First 
Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that un-
lawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—
even if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake about the 
employee’s behavior.132 
In sum, the Court concluded an employer should not escape liability 
where it would have violated an employee’s First Amendment rights, even if 
the employee had not exercised those rights.133 
The Court explained that similar retaliations could dissuade other em-
ployees from engaging in otherwise protected First Amendment activities.134  
Because this potential chilling effect is present in any First Amendment re-
taliation suit, the Court sought to establish an employer intent-based rule.135  
The Court also compared this case to the Court’s political affiliation jurispru-
dence by noting that plaintiffs in those cases do not need to show that they 
have been forced to change their political allegiance to retain employment.136  
Thus, the Court held that Heffernan did not need to show the existence of 
                                                          
 129.  See id. at 1417–18 (distinguishing free-speech retaliation cases from the case at hand based 
on the lack of any factual mistakes).  
 130.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  See id. at 1419 (“The constitutional harm at issue in the ordinary case consists in large part 
of discouraging employees . . . from engaging in protected activities.”). 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id.  
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protected conduct137; because Heffernan could show an injury from the de-
partment’s unlawful motives, Heffernan’s claim could survive summary 
judgment.138 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas turned to the specific language 
of the statute to reach the opposite conclusion.139  First, Justice Thomas noted 
that nothing in the text of Section 1983 provides a remedy against a public 
official who attempts, but fails, to violate someone’s constitutionally pro-
tected rights.140  The threshold question, in Justice Thomas’ opinion, should 
be whether the employee engaged in protected speech.141  Justice Thomas 
believed the inquiry to be at an end once Heffernan denied exercising any 
constitutional rights.142  Because of these denials of protected conduct, Jus-
tice Thomas argued that these circumstances could not amount to a constitu-
tional claim.143  According to Justice Thomas, the City of Paterson’s attempt 
to violate Heffernan’s constitutional rights “never ripened” because Heffer-
nan did not support the Spagnola campaign.144 
Furthermore, Justice Thomas criticized the majority’s attempt to re-
frame the central issue to whether the City acted with unconstitutional mo-
tives.145  Admitting that Heffernan suffered an injury in connection with the 
City’s actions, Justice Thomas asserted that this injury is of the wrong 
brand.146  Justice Thomas continued to argue that even if the city’s motive for 
demoting Heffernan was unconstitutional, without an actual exercise of the 
protected rights, its unconstitutional motive cannot rightfully connect to a 
constitutional injury.147  Thus, Justice Thomas would have maintained the 
                                                          
 137.  The Court, however, did leave some questions unanswered.  For example, it concluded the 
opinion by cautioning that a “neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in 
any political campaign” may be constitutionally permissible.  Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 (1973) (declaring a law that prohibits federal 
employees from engaging in certain political activities to be constitutional).  
 138.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419.  
 139.  See id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 1421.  
 143.  See id. (“Demoting a dutiful son who aids his elderly, bedridden mother may callous, but 
it is not unconstitutional.”). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 1421–22.  
 146.  See id. at 1422 (“But harm alone is not enough; it has to be the right kind of harm.”); see 
also id. (“The mere fact that the government has acted unconstitutionally does not necessarily result 
in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights, even when that individual has been in-
jured.”).  
 147.  See id. (“Even if the majority is correct that demoting Heffernan for a politically motivated 
reason was beyond the scope of the City’s power, the City never invaded Heffernan’s right to speak 
or assemble.  Accordingly, he is not entitled to money damages under [Section] 1983 for the non-
violation of his First Amendment rights.”). 
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requirement of actual First Amendment conduct and held that Heffernan did 
state a cause of action.148 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the Supreme Court held that a govern-
ment employer’s decision to discipline an employee based on the perception 
of First Amendment conduct could still violate that employee’s constitutional 
rights, regardless of whether the employee actually exercised those rights.149  
In reaching this result, the Court strengthened First Amendment protections 
for public employees and wisely chose to focus on the employer’s intent be-
hind their actions rights.150  While reaching a just result in the instant case, 
however, the Court could have arrived at this result on firmer doctrinal 
grounds through a stronger emphasis on its political affiliation jurisprudence 
instead of its reliance on Waters v. Churchill.151  Moreover, the Court built 
these enhanced First Amendment protections for public employees on fragile 
foundations by failing to adequately explain Heffernan’s impact on the cur-
rent retaliation tests and by refusing to explicitly adopt the perceived conduct 
standard.152 
A.  The Court Correctly Held That Heffernan’s Perceived First 
Amendment Conduct Was Sufficient to Survive Summary Judgment 
The Court correctly concluded that the City of Paterson deprived Hef-
fernan of his First Amendment rights by demoting him in response to his 
perceived political conduct.153  The Court expanded the protections public 
employees enjoy by focusing on an employer’s motive for acting, rather than 
the presence of First Amendment conduct.154  Had the Court held otherwise, 
public employers would be given free rein to act with unconstitutional mo-
tives and achieve illegal ends through a legal loophole of mistaken employee 
                                                          
 148.  Id. at 1423.  
 149.  Id. at 1416 (majority opinion).  
 150.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 151.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 152.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 153.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 154.  See id. at 1418.  The Court held:  
We conclude that . . . the government’s reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts 
here.  When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee 
from engaging in political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee is 
entitled to challenge that unlawful action . . . even if, as here, the employer makes a fac-
tual mistake about the employee’s behavior. 
Id.  
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exercise of First Amendment rights.155  Further, the Court reached the correct 
conclusion because the holding “tracks the language of the First Amendment 
more closely than would a contrary rule.”156  The Court honored the phrasing 
of the First Amendment by focusing the judicial inquiry on the government 
employer’s intent, rather than an individual’s action or inaction.157 
Justice Thomas, in contrast, advocated for a rule based on the language 
of Section 1983.158  Had the Court adopted Justice Thomas’ narrower ap-
proach, public employers could discipline employees for engaging in alleg-
edly protected conduct, but if no protected conduct actually existed, the em-
ployer’s discipline, which was inarguably illicitly motivated, would go 
unpunished.159  By grounding the rule in the text of the First Amendment, 
rather than Thomas’ strict statutory construction, the majority strengthened 
First Amendment protections for public employees.160 
The majority also recognized the potential chilling effect on future First 
Amendment conduct of public employees.161  Retaliation based on First 
Amendment conduct “discourag[es] employees—both the employee dis-
charged (or demoted) and his or her colleagues—from engaging in protected 
activities.”162  It follows that a factual mistake as to whether the employees 
                                                          
 155.  Throughout political association jurisprudence, a strong condemnation of government ac-
tion that indirectly burdens constitutional rights informs the narrative of the Court’s opinions.  See, 
e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 77–78 (1990) (“What the First Amendment precludes 
the government from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from accomplishing 
indirectly.”). 
 156.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 157.  The First Amendment is structured to act as a prohibition on government action.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble”); Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 158.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the text of [Section] 
1983 provides a remedy against public officials who attempt but fail to violate someone’s constitu-
tional rights.”). 
 159.  For example, consider an employer who wanted to rid the office of politically active envi-
ronmentalists, and fired an employee based on a faulty assumption that the individual was a member 
of such a group.  Although this motive would be considered illegal, the employee would be without 
recourse because he had not engaged in the conduct that prompted his termination.  Moreover, the 
rest of the office would thereafter be discouraged from participating in environmentally charged 
political advocacy, indirectly accomplishing the employer’s initial (and likely unconstitutional) goal 
of ridding the office of these environmentalists.  A rule of this nature would contradict the Court’s 
admonition that “[w]hat the First Amendment precludes the government from commanding directly, 
it also precludes the government from accomplishing indirectly.”  Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 
U.S. 62, 77–78 (1990); see also Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 302 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“An employer that acts upon such assumptions regarding the [political] affiliation of her 
employees should not escape liability because her assumptions happened to be faulty.”).  
 160.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.   
 161.  Id. at 1419. 
 162.  Id. (“The discharge [or demotion] of one tells the others that they engage in protected ac-
tivity at their peril. . . .  The employer’s factual mistake does not diminish the risk of causing pre-
cisely that same harm.” (citation omitted) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976)).   
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actually engaged in those activities makes no difference; employees will 
likely still view the adverse employment action as a warning to not exercise 
their rights.163  This recognition added both strength to the majority’s analysis 
and teeth to the doctrinal principles going forward. 
Furthermore, the Court recognized that this rule would not grant plain-
tiffs a windfall against their employers, where no protected conduct is at is-
sue.164  The majority suggested that absent actual employee conduct, em-
ployer intent might be more difficult to prove because a plaintiff will need to 
“point to more than his own conduct.”165  By characterizing the employee’s 
showing as “more difficult” than if conduct were present, the Court indicated 
that employers would not be unfairly burdened by this rule.166  Had the Court 
chosen to adopt Justice Thomas’s stricter rule of requiring actual protected 
conduct in every situation, the scales would undoubtedly be tipped in the 
government’s favor.167  By suggesting that employers would not be unduly 
impacted by this rule, the Court wisely noted that plaintiffs will not be able 
to use Heffernan to their unfair advantage. 
B.  The Court Relied Too Heavily on Waters and Missed an 
Opportunity to Merge Association and Speech Claims into a 
Uniform and Consistent Approach 
1.  The Court Placed Improper Emphasis on Waters, Blurring the 
Line Between Free Speech and Political Affiliation 
Jurisprudence 
The Court improperly placed dispositive weight on Waters v. Churchill 
to resolve Heffernan’s case.168  By defining and limiting the issue to whether 
                                                          
 163.  See id. (“The upshot is that a discharge or demotion based upon an employer’s belief that 
the employee has engaged in protected activity can cause the same kind, and degree, of constitu-
tional harm whether that belief does or does not rest upon a factual mistake.”).  At oral argument, a 
number of the Justices showed sincere concern over this potential “chilling” effect and the dangers 
a system of speech restriction may impose.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, 48, 51, 53–55, 
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280). 
 164.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419 (“We concede that . . . it may be more complicated and 
costly for the employee to prove his case.”). 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id.  While the opinion did not state a specific evidentiary standard, the Court implied that 
employees making claims based solely on employer intent would be subjected to a heightened stand-
ard.  See id. (“In a case like this one, the employee will, if anything, find it more difficult to prove 
that motive, for the employee will have to point to more than his own conduct to show an employer’s 
intent to discharge or demote him for engaging in what the employer (mistakenly) believes to have 
been different (and protected) activities.”).  
 167.  Justice Thomas would have maintained the requirement of actual conduct and foreclosed 
the possibility of any suits based on perceived conduct.  See id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 168.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418–19 (majority opinion) (declaring that the principles that 
guided the Waters court would inform the resolution of Heffernan).   
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an employer’s action based on a factual mistake could nonetheless deprive 
Heffernan of his constitutional rights, Waters appeared controlling to the 
Court.169  However, Waters only concerned a free speech claim whereas Hef-
fernan arguably had elements of both free association and free speech 
rights.170  But, at its heart, Heffernan’s claim more closely resembled a per-
ceived affiliation claim, rather than a free speech claim.171  Addressing this 
speech-association hybrid claim, while simultaneously explaining the impact 
of the police department’s factual mistake, would have created a more sub-
stantive and informative opinion.  Although this case opens the door for fu-
ture perceived association cases, treating Waters as dispositive of the ques-
tion in Heffernan unfairly ignored the line of stronger, more directly on-point 
political affiliation cases.172 
Furthermore, Waters dealt with an employer terminating a public em-
ployee on the mistaken belief that the employee’s speech was unprotected.173  
Heffernan, on the other hand, involved a deliberate attempt by a public em-
ployer to punish an employee’s exercise of First Amendment rights.174  While 
the logical connection between the two cases rests on the inquiry as to the 
impact of a factual mistake, Heffernan presented a more egregious example 
of wrongful government behavior.175  The Court overinflated the applicabil-
ity of Waters offered because here, unlike Waters, the government intention-
ally sought to discipline Heffernan’s perceived political affiliation.  Although 
                                                          
 169.  Id. at 1418. 
 170.  Some authority suggests where a case presents mixed questions of affiliation and speech, 
the Court should conduct both the affiliation-based “reasonableness analysis,” as well as the tradi-
tional balancing test in Pickering.  See O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 
(1996) (discussing the different approaches in cases involving political association and free speech 
retaliations).  In Heffernan, the Court almost avoided addressing the applicability of political affil-
iation cases all together.  See 136 S. Ct. at 1417 (noting the Court’s political association jurispru-
dence before focusing solely on the impact of the employer’s factual mistake).   
 171.  In fact, his attorneys attempted to stress this fact throughout their briefs, and focused on it 
almost exclusively at oral argument.  Brief for Petitioner at 15–17, 20–22, Heffernan v. City of 
Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 8, 15–17, supra 
note 163. 
 172.  See infra Part IV.B.3.  
 173.  Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664, 677 (1994).  Further, the Waters plurality essen-
tially only required the employer to have only a reasonable belief that speech was unprotected to 
escape liability.  See id. at 682 (Souter, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality’s rule that “a 
public employer who reasonably believes a third-party report that an employee engaged in consti-
tutionally unprotected speech may punish the employee in reliance on that report, even if it turns 
out that the employee’s actual remarks were constitutionally protected.”).  In Heffernan, the oppo-
site factual scenario (the department acted based on a perception of protected actions) was present.  
Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.  
 174.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. 1417 (describing the activities that Heffernan’s employer had 
thought he engaged in were of the sort they could not constitutionally prevent or discipline). 
 175.  See id. at 1421 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the department’s decision to demote 
Heffernan as “callous”).  
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Waters did provide the foundation to focus on employer motive, it still rec-
ognized the need for actual First Amendment conduct to state a constitutional 
violation.176  Furthermore, Waters could be read to require plaintiffs to show 
that their actions were both protected and that the employer acted with 
knowledge of that fact.177  Thus, by characterizing Waters as solely focusing 
on employer intent,178 the Court unwisely stretched the applicability of Wa-
ters’ reasoning to Heffernan’s case. 
2.  Lower Courts Have Inconsistently Interpreted Waters, 
Exemplifying its Questionable Doctrinal Strength 
In the years following Waters, lower courts have struggled to apply its 
rule uniformly.179  In particular, some courts have seized upon a passage of 
dicta in Waters as grounds to bar plaintiffs from recovery in cases where ac-
tual First Amendment conduct admittedly did not exist180: “We have never 
held that it is a violation of the Constitution for a government employer to 
discharge an employee based on substantively incorrect information.”181  
Courts have routinely used this language to dismiss perceived conduct claims 
like Heffernan’s.182 
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in Dye v. Office of the Racing Commission 
explicitly rejected this language, reading the statement in context as relating 
                                                          
 176.  See Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (reaffirming the traditional requirements for a free speech 
retaliation claim); see also Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1423 (citing Waters, 511 U.S. at 681) (noting 
that the Waters plurality required that “the public employee must allege that she spoke on a matter 
of public concern” to state a claim). 
 177.  See Waters, 511 U.S. at 682 (Souter, J., concurring) (concurring with the plurality’s ruling 
that government may not be liable for punishing protected speech where the employer reasonably 
believed the speech to be unprotected).  The plurality in Waters stated that inadvertently punishing 
protected speech does not always establish a constitutional violation.  Id. at 670; see also, e.g., 
Wasson v. Sonoma Cty. Junior Coll., 203 F.3d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Waters, but still 
maintaining the actual speech requirements).  
 178.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418 (majority opinion) (“We conclude that, as in Waters, the 
government’s reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here.”).  
 179.  See supra Part II.C.  
 180.  See, e.g., Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d and re-
manded, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016); Ambrose v. Township of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 495 (3d Cir. 
2002); Wasson v. Sonoma Cty. Junior Coll., 203 F.3d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 2000); Fogarty v. Boles, 
121 F.3d 886, 890 (3d Cir. 1997).  But see Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 
299–300 (6th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the Third Circuit’s view of Waters and calling its application 
to the First Amendment context “disingenuous”).  
 181.  Waters, 511 U.S. at 679. 
 182.  See Nicholas A. Caselli, Comment, Bursting the Speech Bubble: Toward a More Fitting 
Perceived-Affiliation Standard, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1709, 1745–48 (2015) (arguing that the Waters 
dicta has been misapplied by the Third Circuit, ultimately making it harder for public employees to 
prevail in perceived affiliation cases).  
 108 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 76:88 
 
to due process concerns of public employees facing discipline.183  Most no-
tably, a dissenting opinion from Dye expertly identified the problems associ-
ated with extending Waters beyond its own bounds.184  There, the dissent 
argued that Waters gives more deference to employers and should not serve 
as the basis for expanding employees’ rights.185  Further, the dissent argued 
Waters dealt only with speech claims and should not be extended to affilia-
tion cases.186  Due to this inconsistent interpretation across circuits of Waters’ 
central meaning, the Supreme Court erred in its near total reliance on Waters 
to decide Heffernan’s case.187  Similar to Dye’s dissent, Heffernan could have 
been decided on firmer doctrinal grounds if the Court applied its political 
affiliation jurisprudence.188 
3.  Political Affiliation Jurisprudence Should Have Informed More 
of the Court’s Opinion 
Although elements of speech inevitably existed in Heffernan’s claim, 
his claim more closely resembled a political affiliation case.189  The Court 
could have reached the same result in a much stronger fashion had the ma-
jority applied its political patronage and affiliation precedent.190  Instead, the 
                                                          
 183.  See 702 F.3d 286, 300 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Waters inapplicable and allowing a claim 
based on perceived affiliation to survive summary judgment). 
 184.  Id. at 312–14 (McKeague, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 185.  Id. at 313.  This dissent challenged Waters’ use to favor employee-litigants’ rights because 
Waters had the immediate effect of benefitting an employer.  Id.  
 186.  Id. at 313–14.  The dissent argued that political affiliation jurisprudence better serves to 
answer questions involving perceived affiliation.  Id.  
 187.  Although the Court is permitted to resolve cases this way, this Note contends that the Court 
should have approached Heffernan as a political affiliation case and explicitly adopted a perceived 
conduct approach.  See Caselli, supra note 182, at 1728–39 (arguing that political affiliation juris-
prudence should be the foundation for establishing a perceived affiliation standard). 
 188.  The Court’s majority opinion did acknowledge the similarities between Heffernan’s case 
and political affiliation cases by recognizing “we do not require plaintiffs in political affiliation 
cases to ‘prove that they or other employees’” have been forced to change their political affiliations.  
Heffernan v. City of Paterson 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016) (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 
517 (1980)).  However, the majority did not delve into these ideas further, which could have pro-
vided a clear and sensible extension of the doctrine.  See Caselli, supra note 182, at 1729–31 (ad-
vocating for perceived affiliation cases to be decided based on the Supreme Court’s political pat-
ronage jurisprudence).  
 189.  In actuality, Heffernan’s case could best be described as a speech case “intermixed with a 
political affiliation requirement.”  O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 
(1996).  Because of this, the Court should have done more than its cursory analysis of the political 
affiliation test.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419 (referencing briefly the political affiliation juris-
prudence). 
 190.  Instead of conducting the Pickering analysis, when dealing with affiliation claims, courts 
generally ask only “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appro-
priate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”  Branti, 445 U.S. at 
518.  
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Court began its analysis by articulating the test for speech retaliation cases.191  
Only after ruling that a factual mistake should not bar Heffernan’s claim did 
the Court even mention the possible support coming from political affiliation 
jurisprudence.192 
While Waters supplied enough support to decide the issue as framed by 
the Court, political affiliation cases could have provided a stronger justifica-
tion for the Court to protect Mr. Heffernan’s rights.193  In a typical political 
affiliation case, “there is no requirement that dismissed [or demoted] employ-
ees prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing, 
either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance.”194  Rather, courts look 
to the affiliation or non-affiliation of a plaintiff as a motivating factor for the 
adverse employment decision.195  The circuits that have recognized perceived 
affiliation have also not required an active showing of actual political affili-
ation.196  Had the Court confined the question to one of political identity, the 
case could have been resolved on far firmer doctrinal grounds.197  At a mini-
mum, the Court should have recognized this case’s unique intermixing of 
affiliation and speech and conducted both analyses.198  Instead, the Court 
glossed over an affiliation analysis and unfortunately limited the discussion 
to the impact of a factual mistake in the first part of a Pickering speech anal-
ysis.199  By narrowing their analysis to focus on Waters, the Court built a 
fragile foundation for the perceived affiliation doctrine to build on in the fu-
ture. 
                                                          
 191.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417.  
 192.  Id. at 1419. 
 193.  See Caselli, supra note 182, at 1729–31 (arguing that patronage jurisprudence provides a 
sound foundation plaintiffs to succeed in a perceived affiliation case). 
 194.  Branti, 445 U.S. at 517. 
 195.  Id.  
 196.  See Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 299–300 (6th Cir. 2012) (adopting 
a perceived political affiliation standard and stating that “although active support for a political 
group would help an employee meet his evidentiary burden, such a showing is not required in order 
to guarantee First Amendment protections” (citing Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 939 (1st Cir. 
2008)).  The Sixth Circuit also found that Waters did not provide the support needed to determine 
the outcome of a perceived affiliation case.  Id. at 300. 
 197.  Again, the Court did note the similarity between affiliation cases and the claim Heffernan 
was attempting to assert.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419.  Despite this dictum, the Court merely 
mentioned its political affiliation jurisprudence for secondary support; instead, this Note argues that 
the Court should have used this case law as the primary basis to decide Heffernan’s case.  
 198.  See O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 (1996) (explaining the 
process of addressing questions involving both speech and affiliation to include both the affiliation 
doctrine’s reasonableness inquiries and a Pickering balancing test).  
 199.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417–19.  
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C.  The Court Failed to Adequately Explain the Holding or Explicitly 
Adopt the Perceived Conduct Approach 
1.  The Court’s Analytical Gap Distorted the Current First 
Amendment Retaliation Jurisprudence Without Adequately 
Explaining the Impact of Heffernan 
Without explicitly adopting a new standard for future First Amendment 
retaliation cases, the Court created confusion in existing First Amendment 
retaliation law.200  After recognizing that speech or conduct beyond the scope 
of the First Amendment protection does not require a court to look at the 
government’s reason for an adverse employment decision, the Court con-
cluded that “the government’s reason for demoting Heffernan” would drive 
the resolution of the case.201  Thus, the Court never explained why Heffer-
nan’s lack of protected conduct was not dispositive in this case; it merely 
stated that if an employer acts to punish or prevent protected activity, the 
employee may challenge the action, even if the employer makes a factual 
mistake about the behavior in question.202 
By offering no insight into how the Court bridged this gap, the majority 
opinion missed a crucial opportunity to decide the case based on more appli-
cable precedent, which would guide courts and litigants in future First 
Amendment retaliation cases.203  This analytical gap in the Court’s reasoning, 
while still allowing the court to reach a just result in the instant case, will 
potentially limit this holding only to cases involving factual mistakes.204  Had 
the Court chosen to explicitly adopt the perceived conduct standards,205 and 
done away with conduct as a requirement, Heffernan may have been a more 
decisive victory for First Amendment protections. 
                                                          
 200.  See id. (discussing various First Amendment retaliation cases and explaining why they may 
or may not apply to the case at bar.). 
 201.  Id. at 1418.  The Court failed to explain the connection between its conclusion that em-
ployer motive was the proper inquiry and its previous reference to Connick’s conclusion that “if the 
employee has not engaged in what can ‘be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of 
public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [the employee’s] discharge [or 
demotion].’”  Id. at 1417 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).   
 202.  Id. at 1418.  
 203.  The Court did note how this factual background may not be common, and that very few 
cases were directly on point.  See id. at 1417–18 (noting that foundational cases, such as Connick, 
Pickering, and Garcetti could not directly guide the narrowly framed issue of factual mistakes). 
 204.  See id. at 1417–18 (explaining why the Connick and Pickering line of cases could not re-
solve the case because they contained no factual mistake). 
 205.  In fact, the Court only cited one case that recognized a perceived affiliation standard from 
a lower court, early on and before addressing the substantive issues. Id. at 1416–17 (citing Dye v. 
Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 300 (6th Cir. 2012)).  
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2.  The Potential Effects of Heffernan on the First Amendment 
Retaliation Tests 
To prevail in a protected speech retaliation case, “an employee must 
prove [(1)] that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, and [(2)] 
that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the [adverse employment de-
cision].”206  After establishing these threshold requirements, courts employ 
the Pickering balancing test and weigh “the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”207  Absent certain exceptions,208 when this 
balance leans in favor of an employee’s First Amendment rights, courts will 
hold the government liable for its unconstitutional retaliation.209  After Hef-
fernan however, the Court may have created space to fundamentally alter the 
weight of each prong of the analysis.210 
By placing employer motive at the center of the inquiry, the Court im-
plied that actual First Amendment conduct may no longer be dispositive 
when faced with First Amendment retaliation claims.211  While First Amend-
ment activity may strengthen a plaintiff’s case, Heffernan suggests that it may 
not always be necessary.212  Rather, where actual First Amendment conduct 
and illicit motive  exist, courts may begin Pickering’s balancing test with a 
strong presumption of a constitutional violation.213  Under Heffernan, where 
                                                          
 206.  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).  
 207.  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 208.  For example, the Court has held that “government can escape liability by showing that it 
would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct.”  Umbehr, 518 U.S. 
at 675 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).  How-
ever, Heffernan may have rendered this exception meaningless in certain circumstances.  See infra 
Part IV.C.3.  
 209.  See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (describing how to strike the balance between interests 
to determine whether liability is appropriate).  
 210.  At first glance, this holding may apply to only circumstances where an employer makes a 
factual mistake.  The holding may, however, have placed dispositive weight on the employer’s mo-
tive behind the employment decision.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418 (characterizing the gov-
ernment’s motive as dispositive).  
 211.  The Court explained, “[i]f the employer’s motive . . . is what mattered in Waters, why is 
the same not true [for Heffernan]?  After all, in the law, what is sauce for the goose is normally 
sauce for the gander.”  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418; see also, e.g., Dye, 702 F.3d at 299 (suggesting 
that while active First Amendment conduct may help a plaintiff’s case, it is not necessary to guar-
antee First Amendment protection) (citing Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 939 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 212.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418–19; see also Dye, 702 F.3d at 299 (explaining that party 
affiliation may help a plaintiff’s case, but is not necessary); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 
(1980) (holding that “there is no requirement that dismissed employees that they, or other employ-
ees, have been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance”).   
 213.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418 (distinguishing this case from cases in the past where 
“the only way to show that the employer’s motive was unconstitutional was to prove that the con-
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no First Amendment conduct existed, but a plaintiff can still show an em-
ployer’s “desire to prevent the employee from engaging in . . . activity that 
the First Amendment protects,” courts may disregard the threshold question 
of whether First Amendment activity existed at all.214  Using this formulation, 
the ultimate Pickering balance test outcome may depend on whether or not a 
plaintiff can show an illicit motive on the part of the employer.215  Finally, by 
permitting Heffernan’s claim to proceed in the absence of protected conduct, 
the exception allowing employers to escape liability upon showing they 
would have made the decision without the protected conduct at issue may no 
longer do any real work.216  For if the government can show it would have 
made the same employment decision absent First Amendment conduct, its 
actions may lack the requisite motive Heffernan requires.217 
To prevail in a political affiliation retaliation case, a plaintiff must show 
that party affiliation is not a reasonable requirement to perform the job.218  
Plaintiffs do not need to show they changed party affiliation, but only that 
they faced adverse treatment because of their affiliations or non-affilia-
tions.219  In the face of a circuit split over whether a claim could be based on 
a perceived political affiliation,220 Heffernan seems to have opened the door 
to allow perceived affiliation claims to survive summary judgment.221  Un-
fortunately, because of the minimal analysis devoted to political affiliation 
jurisprudence,222 it remains unclear how wide the Court actually opened this 
door. 
                                                          
troversial statement or activity . . . was in fact protected by the First Amendment.”); see also Gar-
cetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444–45 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges must apply differ-
ent protective presumptions in different contexts, scrutinizing government’s speech-related re-
strictions differently depending upon the general category of activity.”). 
 214.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.  
 215.  While this holding definitely benefits plaintiffs in Heffernan’s position, it may actually 
make it harder for others to succeed in cases with similar claims but employer motives that are 
difficult to prove.  See id. at 1419 (acknowledging that plaintiffs will need to produce more evidence 
of employer motive where protected conduct does not exist).  
 216.  See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (citing Mt. Healthy City 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)) (explaining that the government may 
escape liability if they can show the adverse employment action would have been taken even in the 
absence of the First Amendment conduct).  
 217.  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 218.  See supra Part II.B.1.  Courts use a “reasonableness analysis” to make these determina-
tions.  O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 (1996). 
 219.  See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (explaining that courts do not require 
a plaintiff to show they actually changed party affiliation).  
 220.  See supra Part II.C.3.  
 221.  See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416 (accepting the case to determine whether the correctness 
of the Third Circuit’s rejection of perceived affiliation claims). 
 222.  Id. at 1417–20.  The Court devoted the first two paragraphs of their analysis and a handful 
of sentences later on to these principles, but focused almost entirely on speech retaliations.  Id.   
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3.  Lower Courts’ Initial Readings of Heffernan Have Demonstrated 
Confusion Over the Application of the Case 
While courts have not had many opportunities to interpret Heffernan, a 
few cases have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the decision.223  
First, some courts have permitted suits based on employer’s mistaken beliefs 
to survive summary judgment, following Heffernan’s central holding.224  Fur-
thermore, courts have read Heffernan to formally recognize claims based on 
perceived political affiliations.225  Similarly, in Fuller v. Brownsville Inde-
pendent School District,226 a federal district court analyzed on the govern-
ment’s subjective belief and motive for acting, rather than the plaintiff’s ac-
tual affiliations.227  Conversely, courts have rejected some attempts to extend 
Heffernan, including where the employee, and not employer, made the fac-
tual mistake.228  Moreover, at least one court prevented a Heffernan perceived 
association claim where the employee’s actions took place pursuant to his 
employment duties.229  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Heffernan to 
mean that “the employee must prove an improper employer motive,”230 but 
only after showing the presence of protected speech or conduct.231 
                                                          
 223.  See infra notes 224–233 and accompanying text.  
 224.  See, e.g., Vale v. City of New Haven, No. 3:11-cv-00632, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93635, 
at *27–29 (D. Conn. July 19, 2016) (citing Heffernan to allow a First Amendment based suit to 
proceed where the employer mistakenly believed the employee reported wage violations to the Con-
necticut Dept. of Labor); Czapiewski v. Russell, No. 15-cv-208-bbc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93209, 
at *9 (W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016) (finding no constitutional violation if defendant reasonably believed 
the speech to be unprotected). 
 225.  See, e.g., Zehner v. Jordan-Elbridge Bd. of Educ., No. 15-3539-cv, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20640, at *12 (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 2016) (stating that Heffernan allows for claims to be based on 
“perceived” rather than actual association); Peterson v. Farrow, No. 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-EFB, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88332, at *19–20 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2016) (recognizing Heffernan’s holding 
as establishing the perceived association claim). 
 226.  No. B: 13-109, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95227, at *32–34 (S.D. Tex. May 18, 2016).  
 227.  See id. (rejecting plaintiff’s First Amendment claims because the defendant did not believe, 
mistakenly or not, that the plaintiff exercised any First Amendment activity).  
 228.  See Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 829 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a 
plaintiff’s attempt to state a First Amendment claim in which the employee, not the employer, made 
a factual mistake about whether the conduct was protected); see also Brickey v. Hall, 828 F.3d 298, 
308 n.7 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating that Heffernan does not apply to factually incorrect employee 
speech); Zitter v. Petruccelli, No. 15-6488, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135656, at *23 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 
2016) (distinguishing Heffernan on the grounds that an unfulfilled offer to testify does not amount 
to speech nor did the government perceive any speech to happen). 
 229.  See Hughes v. City of New York, No. 15. Civ. 5629, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81982, at *28 
(E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016) (ruling a factual mistake irrelevant because any supposed First Amend-
ment conduct occurred pursuant to the plaintiff’s employment duties under Garcetti).  
 230.  VanDeWalle v. Leon Cty. Fla., No. 16-10129, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16578, at *9 (11th 
Cir. Sept. 9, 2016) (quoting Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016)). 
 231.  See id. at *8–10 (describing the test for First Amendment retaliation to require the presence 
of protected speech, a Pickering balance in favor of the employee, and a causal connection between 
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The Tenth Circuit expressed concern over the uncertain scope of Hef-
fernan’s holding.232  Although this court was able to resolve its case without 
determining the reach of Heffernan, the opinion suggested that more litiga-
tion will result, as Heffernan’s scope will need to be determined eventu-
ally.233  Because of the potentially narrow and non-specific nature of Heffer-
nan’s holding, these inconsistencies will require future attention from the 
Supreme Court to solidify the First Amendment protections Heffernan im-
perfectly created. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the Supreme Court held that a public 
employee may challenge his demotion or discharge where the employer acts 
in retaliation for the exercise of protected First Amendment conduct, even if 
the employer acted on the mistaken belief that the employee exercised pro-
tected conduct.234  In reaching this just conclusion, the Court both strength-
ened First Amendment protections for public employees and dispelled no-
tions that the ruling would unfairly burden public employers.235  
Unfortunately, however, the Court placed improper emphasis on Waters v. 
Churchill and instead should have resolved Heffernan on firmer doctrinal 
grounds by conducting a more in-depth analysis of its political affiliation ju-
risprudence and applying it to the facts of the case.236  Furthermore, by failing 
to explicitly adopt perceived conduct standards, the Court’s opinion did not 
explain how Heffernan may alter First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence, 
leaving lower courts the task of attempting to answer this question.237  In sum, 
although the Court ostensibly increased First Amendment protections for 
public employees, it failed to create a stable foundation for future First 
Amendment retaliation litigants to build upon. 
                                                          
the speech and the adverse employment action).  It appears the Eleventh Circuit did not read Hef-
fernan to affect whether actual speech or conduct was required in a First Amendment retaliation 
suit.  Id.  
 232.  See Bird v. West Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2016) (expressing con-
fusion relating to “how far the Supreme Court’s decision in Heffernan extends”).  
 233.  Id.  While the factual scenario in Bird closely resembled Heffernan, the Tenth Circuit sug-
gested that Heffernan’s scope still needs further development.  Id.  
 234.  See supra Part III. 
 235.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 236.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 237.  See supra Part IV.C. 
